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ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of review.
What must be kept in clear focus in the review of this

case is that the $500,000 "Line of Credit" issue (the primary
issue of United f s appeal) was decided upon summary judgment
motion.
The applicable standard of review of summary judgment
decisions is, indeed, articulated in Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt
Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989), cited
by Dore, where the Court noted:
"Our standard of review when considering
challenges to a summary judgment is settled.
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate
only when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P.
56(c); see e.g., Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H
Insurance Co., 714 P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986).
In determining whether the trial court
correctly found that there was no genuine
issue of material fact, we view the facts and
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the losing party. E.g.,
Id. at 649; Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National
Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); Beck v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 802 (Utah
1985)."
See also, Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 795 P2d 1133, 1135 (Utah
1990); and Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714 P2d 648, 649
(Utah 1986).
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B.

If the applicable standard of review is here employed, the

summary judgment cannot stand.
Judge Omer Call determined that before the obligation
to furnish the "Line of Credit" would exist, it was necessary for
United, presumably at the time of its demand for performance of
the obligation to advance the funds specified, to tender
"marketable title, free and clear of liens or encumbrances and
reasonable certainty of freedom from lawsuits".
Decision, 4-8-86, p. 3.

Memorandum

He so ruled despite the fact that, in

the same opinion, he acknowledged an agreement on the part of
Dore's parent company, LLC Corporation, that a title insurance
commitment would satisfy Dore's title requirements (Memorandum
Decision, 4-8-86, p. 2; (see Depo., Friedrich, 12-21-83, pp. 4749)), and despite his determination that as early as October 15,
1981, Dore had had knowledge of the Hoffman claims (Order
Determg. Uncontrvd. Facts, 5-21-86, pp. 4-5).
With no witnesses before him, Judge Call's
determination as to what the parties "contemplated" could not be
appropriate.

Factual issues remained, and his ruling was

inappropriate.

C.

Pore's uncorroborated argument of fact will not bolster Judge

Call's otherwise infirm determination.
These remarkable statements are found in Dore's Brief:
1.

It was required that United have the ability to

- 2 -

convey "marketable" title to the mining property.
have that ability.

It did not

(Dore Brf. p. 12.)

Dore's apparent contention is that because part of the
Bannock stock was originally purchased with Hoffman funds, United
did not in fact own the Bannock stock.
2.

Hoffman had a lien on the stock.

(Dore Brf. p.

3.

Even if it is ultimately determined that in the

12.)

Idaho litigation Hoffman did not have such a right (presumably
the lien upon the stock), he, nevertheless, claimed such a right
at the times relevant to this action.

(Dore Brf. p. 12.)

We are given no references for these statements,
presumably because there is no factual basis for any of them.

At

all times critical to this action, United has owned all of the
stock in Bannock.

Hoffman has never made a claim that he owned

either the stock nor that he had a lien right in the stock.

No

one has ever determined that he had a lien right, either to the
stock, or to the mining properties.
What was asked by Hoffman and the relief to which he
was entitled are best determined from Hoffman v. United Silver,
116 Idaho 240, 775 P2d 132 (Ct.App. 1989).
1.

As to the requests contained in Hoffman's complaint

(775 P2d at pp. 136-137):
". . Hoffman brought this suit. He asked the
court to compel a full accounting; to grant
access to the partnership's books; to award
damages for denial of access to those books;
and to declare that he had fully performed
his obligation in Phase I, entitling him to a
- 3 -

25% interest in the partnership (Vipont
Silver Mines, Ltd.)- 11
2.

As to what Hoffman received (775 P2d at p. 140):

11

. . although we sustain the district court's
determination that it is permissible for the
limited partner to invest $400,000 in Phase
I, leaving the balance of $350,000 to be
funded by the leaching operation, we also
hold that any entitlement to a 25% long-term
interest in the partnership must await the
completion of Phase I through an aggregate
investment of $750,000, That portion of the
district court's judgment which declares
Hoffman presently to have 'a twenty-five
percent (25%) ownership in (the) partnership1
is hereby set aside. The district court is
instructed to modify the judgment on remand.
The remainder of the judgment — denominating
funds advanced by the limited partner as
'loans,1 ordering a formal accounting and
periodic audits of the partnership's books,
and awarding $1,500 in damages for earlier
denial of access to the books — is
affirmed."

D.

United tendered to Dore everything to which it was entitled

at the time of United's demand for loans contemplated under the
"Line of Credit".
As we have argued, the deposition of Dore's principal,
Stephen Friedrich, rather nicely established that Dore received
everything to which it was entitled in terms of "quality of
title" and "security" at the time of the United Silver demand.
It was tendered security against Bannock's unencumbered mining
property, together with the commitment for title insurance upon
that property in the amount of $6,000,000.00.
This was substantial performance by the proposed
mortgagor.

If we substitute "mortgagor" for "vendor", and
- 4

"mortgagee" for "buyer" in the language of a case cited by both
parties to this appeal, Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 513 P2d 417,
421 (1973), this is what we are told:
"First, the law does not require the
(mortgagor) vendor to have clear and
marketable title at all times during the
performance of his contract, and is not
ordinarily so obliged until the time comes
for him to perform. The (mortgagee) buyer
should not be heard to complain unless it
appears that it will be impossible or at
least highly unlikely that the (mortgagor)
seller will be able to perform his contract
when he is called upon to do so, (citations)
which we do not see as the situation here.
Complementing this is the fact that the
(mortgagee) buyer himself should not be heard
to complain when it is his own default which
is preventing fulfillment of the contract."
Also cited in both Briefs is Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671
P2d 224 (Utah 1983).

As the Hall Court noted (671 P2d at p.

227), title refers to a fee simple estate.
had that fee simple estate.

Certainly, Bannock

In Hall v. Fitzgerald, it should be

noted that the vendor was successful in his action against the
purchaser, even though he didn't have "legal title" to the
property in question at the time that he demanded performance.
United is apparently criticized for citing McFadden v.
Wilder, 429 P2d 694, 697-698 (Ariz.App. 1967), although Dore
takes some comfort in the same case.

We would note that

"marketable title" and "acceptable owner's title insurance
policy" appear to be treated as synonymous in this language of
the Arizona Court:
"The duty of the defendant to provide
marketable title in the form of an acceptable
owner's title insurance policy was a
- 5 -

concurrent condition with the duty of the
plaintiffs to provide the satisfaction of the
1959 mortgage.fl
Perhaps the real significance of the McFadden case,
however, as it relates to Dore's present arguments, is found in
this language (from P. 698):
"To prevent specific performance the failure
to perform a condition must be material.
Restatement, Contracts § 275 Comment C, §
374."
In the present case, a party who required security for
a $500,000.00 loan was offered the property with a $6,000,000.00
commitment of title insurance thereupon.

Was it really

"material" that the corporation, which owned the stock of the
company against whom the mortgage was to be given, was then the
defendant in a lawsuit requesting the relief specified at page
(4)?

E.

The Hoffman claims could not have clouded the Bannock title

to the property which was to constitute security for the
advancement of the "Line of Credit".
While the analysis in United f s Opening Brief would seem
to be complete, perhaps this statement will make it more graphic:
1.

Before it advanced the funds contemplated in the

"Line of Credit" agreement, Dore was entitled to security for the
funds advanced;
2.

United, the owner of the Bannock stock, and the

controller of Bannockfs corporate affairs, tendered that security
as contemplated in the contract, a deed of trust against the
- 6 -

mining properties;
3.

The mining properties were owned by Bannock;

4.

The mining properties were unencumbered;

5.

Hillam Abstract Company committed to insurance of

Bannock's title to Dore's benefit in the amount of $6,000,000.00;
6.

At that time, there was a pending claim by Hoffman

against United in Idaho, asking for:
(a) an accounting;
(b) access to the books of a limited partnership,
Vipont Silver Mines, Ltd.;
(c) an award of damages for denial of access to
those books; and
(d) a declaration that Hoffman had fully performed
his obligation of the limited partnership entitling him
to a 25% interest in the limited partnership;
7.

Hoffman made no claim against Bannock (and, indeed,

still has made no claim against Bannock);
8.

Hoffman filed no action in Utah (the situs of the

property), which in any way related to the mining properties
(and, indeed, has yet to file any such claim).
Dore cites authority, primarily from Colorado, which
would seem to say that wherever there is a "hazard of litigation"
concerning real property, which is the subject of a contract
requiring the conveyance of that property from one party to
another, it cannot be said that the property is "marketable".
find it difficult to believe that this virtually impossible
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We

standard of "marketability" is the Utah rule.

An examination of

the cases causes us to question whether it is the rule anywhere.
In Hedgecock v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 676 P2d
1208 (Colo.App. 1983) , this language can be found (676 P2d at p.
1210):
"To be marketable, a ftitle must be such as
to make it reasonably certain that it will
not be called into question in the future so
as to subject the purchaser to the hazard of
litigation with reference thereto.f Morley
v. Gieseker, 142 Colo. 490, 351 P.2d 392
(1960)."
Critical to the Colorado case is the statement that it is the
"title" which is "reasonably certain" of freedom from litigation,
and not any particular party.
questioning Bannock's title.

Here, nothing has ever been filed
Moreover, there is a considerable

list of defects of title in the Colorado case, which were
certainly not present here.

In Michaelson v. Tieman, 541 P2d 91

(Colo.App. 1975) , there was an overlap of contending property
descriptions.
The allegedly supportive language in Paramount
Properties Co. v. Transamerica Title Insurance Co., 463 P2d 746
(Calif. 1970) , is dicta, found in a footnote which reads:
"An adverse claim to property may of course
constitute a substantial cloud on the title
and may even render the title unmarketable.
Because the maintenance of a quiet title
action may involve litigation of considerable
duration, an owner who is attempting to sell
land may be extremely vulnerable to
harassment by persons fraudulently purporting
to hold adverse claims."

- 8 -

There was no quiet title action against Bannock's property;
indeed, there was no action whatever, either against the owner of
the property, or in the state where the property is situated.
We are told that the burden of proving that title is
"marketable" is upon the party who claims that "marketability",
and for this proposition we are cited Michaelson v. Tieman,
supra, the Colorado Court of Appeals decision noted above.

We

wonder just how much it takes to meet this burden when in our
case United tendered a $6,000,000.00 title insurance commitment,
demonstrated that the property in question was free of
encumbrances, illustrated that there was no direct claim against
the property (and no claim at all against Bannock) in the Idaho
case, and that there was no action pending in Utah.
We are, of course, aware that there are cases that
conclude that a commitment of title insurance does not render
title "marketable".

See, Kipahulu Inv. Co. v. Seltzer

Partnership, 675 P2d 778 (Haw.App. 1983); and Makofskv v.
Cunningham, 576 F2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1958).

What we are not so

certain about is (1) Judge Call's basis for determining that
"marketable title" was "the contemplation of the parties", as to
the security to be tendered to Dore, (2) whether the title was
not "marketable" at the time of tender within the definitions of
the Utah Court, and (3) whether any concurrent condition of the
applicable contract was not met by the tender, in any event.
The cases cited by Dore in support of what appears to
be a "breach of condition precedent" argument (purportedly
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excusing Dore because of United 1 s claimed breach) do not support
Dore.
Converse v. Zinke, 625 P2d 882 (Colo. 1981), is a
"failure of consideration" case, where it was determined that the
failure must be "material" before concurring performance is
excused.

Summary judgment, on the basis of purported title

problems, was denied in Windward Partners v. Lopes, 640 P2d 872
(Haw.App. 1982).

In Parsons Supply, Inc. v. Smith, 591 P2d 821

(Wash.App. 1979), the Court found no "substantial" breach to
justify failure of performance.

The Montana Court in Rogers v.

Relyea, 601 P2d 37 (1979), speaks in terms of "substantial or
material breach", and defines that breach as one which "defeats
the object of the parties in making the contract".

No such

breach can be claimed in this case.
In summary, there was no basis for the dismissal of the
claim for relief under paragraph 5(c) of the "Vipont Confirmation
Project Agreement" of May 28, 1981.

Certainly, if the merits of

the situation are not obviously in United 1 s favor, the facts were
not at rest, and the factual determinations upon which Judge
Call's opinion was based are not, when interpreted according to
Utah reasoning, sufficient.

F.

United is entitled to fees for resisting Pore's rescission

claim.
We are told by Dore that whatever the law of other
states may be, as to whether the defense of a claim which

- 10 -

attempts to rescind a contract is legal activity associated with
either the enforcement or the defense of the contract, Utah law
is that it is not.

It would be useful if Dore would cite cases

which support that proposition.
Rather, it cites 50 W. Broadway Associates v.
Redevelopment Agency, 784 P2d 1162 (Utah 1989), which doesn't
address the question at all, but does contain some salutary
language applicable to why rescission was inappropriate in this
case.

We quote from 784 P2d at pp. 1170-1171:
"To rescind a partially executed contract,
the party seeking rescission usually must be
able to place the other party in the same
position that existed before the execution of
the contract. (Citations.) 'Generally, if
parties cannot be put back into statu quo, a
contract can be rescinded only where the
clearest and strongest reason and equity
imperatively demand it.1 17 Am.Jur.2d
Contracts § 514, at 998 (1964).fl
BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow, 586 P2d 456 (Utah 1978),

concludes that a party who seeks rescission and is successful is
not entitled to attorney fees, basing that opinion upon an
earlier Oregon case, and concluding that if rescission is granted
there remains no contract upon which to make the award.

Quealy

v. Anderson, 714 P2d 667 (Utah 1986), cited as being in "accord"
with BLT Inv. Co., doesn't involve rescission, but, rather, the
subject of "accord".
In fact, is not Dore "hoisted on its own petard".

It

argues, based upon BLT Inv. Co. v. Snow, supra, and its Oregon
predecessor (Bodenhamer v. Patterson, 563 P2d 1212 (1977)), that
if the contract is avoided in the rescission action, there is no
- 11 -

contract left upon which to make a claim for attorney fees.

By

the same reasoning, would it not be correct that if the contract
is not rescinded, and the contract remains in effect, that the
party who successfully defends the rescission action, and thusly
successfully defends the contract, should be entitled to a
reasonable attorney fee?

See, Bell v. Richards, 741 P2d 788,

790-791 (Mont. 1987).
United should have been awarded its fees in defense of
the contract.

G.

The attorney fee award to Pore is inappropriate for the

effort expended, and certainly should not be fixed at a higher
amount.
In its argument as to the propriety of the attorney fee
awarded to it, Dore attempts to ride two horses simultaneously.
It argues the determination of the amount of an attorney fee is
discretionary with the district court, and for that reason there
should be no reduction of the award.

Then it reverses itself,

and argues that there was no basis for the Court's failure to
award it the amount it requested, an amount approximately six
times higher than the amount awarded.
We begin our discussion by noting that the trial court
determined that Dore was entitled to a fee only for its defense
of the counterclaim, that is, the request for enforcement of
paragraph 5(c) of the Agreement, the "Line of Credit" provision.
Dore's claim for fees, however, was presented in a gross amount,
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reflective not only of the defense of the counterclaim, but also
of its attempt to rescind the contract, and its attempt to
recover damages against United for purported losses sustained by
Dore.

The total amount of hours invested was claimed to have

been 1507.3 0 hours, at hourly rates which would average at about
$90 per hour, ratably allocated against the total.

This was a

fee claim of in excess of $135,000.00.
In its "Memorandum Decision" of March 29, 1989, the
trial court reasoned:
(1)

Of the 1507.30 total hours expended by the

Martineau firm, approximately one-third related to the period of
time between February, 1985, and August, 1986 (the time of the
development, presentation, argument and determination of the
summary judgment of dismissal of the claim for the advancement of
the "Line of Credit", as well as much other case activity).
(2)

Of this 500-hour investment, the trial court

concluded that approximately one-half of the time went into the
defense of the counterclaim, thusly concluding that about 250
hours of the Martineau firm's time went into the actual defense
of the counterclaim.
(3)

This 250-hour investment (approximate) resulted in

the award of $24,100.00.
The Court's determinations were factual findings.
In Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P2d 985 (Utah
1988), cited by Dore, the Court concluded:
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is
in the sound discretion of the trial court,
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Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah
1984) , and will not be overturned in the
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of
discretion. Turtle Management, Inc. v.
Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d at 671."
(Dixie State Bank, supra, 764 P2d at p. 988).
In Dixie State Bank, the trial court had concluded that the
amount requested (in an action for recovery upon a promissory
note), the amount of $4,847.50, was "fair and reasonable11 (Dixie
State Bank, supra, 764 P2d at pp. 990-991).

However, the trial

court allowed only $1,500.00 of that amount, "citing public
discontent over the levels to which attorney fees have risen and
the comparatively modest amount put in issue by the complaint"
(Dixie State Bank, supra, 764 P2d at p. 987).
In other words, the trial court concluded that the
amount requested was reasonable, but disallowed a substantial
amount thereof for what could be characterized as political
reasons.

The Supreme Court disagreed.
This is not the situation in our case, where the trial

court carefully thought out the award process, and determined a
figure which it felt was fair, based upon what part of counsel's
total time was invested in the activity for which the fee was
awarded.

The Court, in the process, gave the explanation

required in Regional Sales Agency v. Reichert, 784 P2d 1210, 1215
(Utah App. 1989).
While United believes that the award was out of
proportion to the activity for which the fee was given, it
certainly cannot be said that the trial court failed to exercise
its discretion, or failed to support its fee award by
- 14 -

articulating the reasoning that went into that award.

No

additional award should be given.

H.

There is no basis for reversal of the trial court's

determination that the $43,000 payment for timber purchased by
United with Dore funds did not qive rise to an award in favor of
Dore and against United.
Dore claimed that substantial amounts went to United
which were not used for legitimate contract purposes, including
$43,000 for the purchase of timber which was claimed to have not
been used at the Vipont Mine.

United asserted that the timber

was for use as part of the "Vipont Joint Venture Agreement",
which was never finalized, but that it had been purchased with
Dore's specific approval.

The district court found that the

timber, at the time of trial, had "little or no value either to
the mine operation or otherwise".
In this regard, the trial court found:
1.

Dore was to provide the $43,000 for the purchase of

timber for the rehabilitation of the A-Level and for the Miller
crosscut (tunnels).
2.

There was some confusion in the testimony as to

just what work was accomplished by United on the tunnels.
3.

However, some work was accomplished and timber was

used in connection with that work.
4.

The timber purchased with the $43,000 advanced by

Dore was not, however, used on the project and never left the
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timber supplier's lot.
5.

The evidence did not establish who had the

responsibility to use the timber on the tunnels, and why other
timber was purchased for that purpose.
6.

Dore and its agent, Marsten, had at least equal

fault in not seeing to it that the $43,000 worth of timber,
rather than other timber, was used on the tunnels.
7.

The timber, though purchased for $4 3,000, had, at

the time of trial, little or no value, either to the mine
operation or otherwise.

Memorandum Decision, 8-31-88, pp. 5-6.

The Court concluded, based upon these findings, that no
award to Dore, in this regard, was appropriate.

Memorandum

Decision, 8-31-88, p. 6.
Utah law and procedural rules (Rule 52(a)) provide that
findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and to successfully attack those findings, an appellant must
first marshal all of the evidence in support of the findings, and
then demonstrate that this evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the
findings against an attack.

Grayson Roper, Ltd. v. Finlinson,

782 P2d 467, 470 (Utah 1990); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
776 P2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); Harline v. Campbell, 728 P2d 980,
982 (Utah 1986) ; Sharpe v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 671
P2d 185, 187 (Utah 1983).
As the cases note, the legal sufficiency of the
evidence is determined by the standards set out in Civil Rule
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52(a), which provides:
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.If
While we would agree that a finding without support in
the evidence is subject to attack, what we can't see is where
that principle has any applicability in this case.
Cases cited by Dore for a contrary position are not
dispositive.

Indeed, in Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P2d 1046 (Utah

Ct.App. 1990), a paternity action where a child support award was
denied, this statement is found (at p. 1048):
11

. . w e will regard a finding as clearly
erroneous only if the finding is without
adequate evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law. Western Capital
and Sec. Co., Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 989,
991 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)."
In summary, the trial court reviewed the facts, heard
the witnesses and entered its decision as to this point, and
there is no basis for reversal.

I.

The district court's denial of rescission was a correct

determination, and should be affirmed upon appeal.
Concerning Dore's rescission claim, the trial court in
its Memorandum Decision of 8-31-88, found:
1.

Dore was, at all relevant times, either aware of

the Hoffman claim, and what effect it might have upon the title
of the Bannock mining properties, or should have been thusly
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aware had it exercised reasonable diligence to determine the
situation.

Memo.Dec. 8-31-88, p. 3.
2.

Despite its knowledge of the Hoffman claim and the

problems that the claim might present, Dore elected to proceed
with the confirmation project and to explore the Mine's
potential.

Memo.Dec. 8-31-88, p. 3.
3.

In October, 1981 (after most of the confirmation

project activity had been accomplished) , _it surely became
apparent to Dore that United could not provide "marketable
title".

Memo.Dec. 8-31-88, p. 3.
4.

Despite Dore's actual knowledge of the Hoffman

claim and the problems it presented, or despite the knowledge
which Dore would have acquired had it acted reasonably toward
that acquisition, Dore proceeded with the confirmation project.
Memo.Dec. 8-31-88, p. 3.
5.

The monies expended in connection with the

confirmation project were expended with the knowledge of Dore as
to the risk from the Hoffman claim, or were expended when Dore,
in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have been aware
of the nature and extent of that claim.
6.

Memo.Dec. 8-31-88, p. 3.

Despite the fact that Dore had to have had actual

knowledge of the Hoffman claim and its problems by October, 1981,
it continued requesting, and receiving, extensions of its option
to enter into the "Joint Venture Agreement" (the operational part
of the relationship with United) for approximately three (3)
years.

Memo.Dec. 8-31-88, p. 4.
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7.

During the extended (three-year) period, additional

negotiations took place, and United attempted to obtain
marketable title "or a policy of title insurance" on the
property.

Memo*Dec. 8-31-88, p. 4.
8.

"Such a policy was obtained".

Memo.Dec. 8-31-88,

9.

The policy was not, however, "to the satisfaction

p. 4.

of (Dore)" "and for that reason and perhaps others (Dore) decided
not to exercise its option to execute the 'Joint Venture
Agreement1".

Memo.Dec. 8-31-88, p. 4.

(In this summary, we have paraphrased the findings and
conclusions, but we believe that we have done so consistent with
the Court's language.)
On the basis of these findings, the trial court
determined that Dore was precluded from obtaining rescission of
the Confirmation Agreement.

Memo.Dec. 8-31-88, p. 3,

It is, of course, not every purported breach of a
contract which justifies rescission.

Before rescission is

justified, there must be a material breach, not waived by the
party seeking rescission, as to which breach that party, promptly
upon knowledge thereof, unequivocally claims a right to
rescission, restoring, or offering to restore, the other party to
the benefits of the contract.

Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591

P2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979); Havas v. Alger, 461 P2d 857 (Nev.
1969); Williston on Contracts, 3d Ed., Vol. 12, Sec. 1455.
cannot claim as a basis for rescission a fact known to the
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One

claimant party before the contract was executed.

Leonard v.

Woodruff, 65 P. 199, 203 (Utah 1901).
Assuming that one has a right to rescind, based upon a
material breach, or misrepresentation, since the contract is not
void but only voidable, the injured party has a right to affirm
the contract and to treat it as valid.
P2d 840, 845 (Utah 1949).

Frailev v. McGarry. 211

This being so, if a party wishes to

elect to rescind the contract, he must not, after discovery of
the breach, do any substantial act which recognizes the contract.
Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co. of Portsmouth, 232 P2d
754, 758 (Utah 1951); Frailey v. McGarry, supra, 211 P2d at pp.
844, 846.

As the Frailey decision states, if one desires to

rescind, one must, after discovery of the alleged breach,
announce that purpose, and adhere to it.
Acts by a claimant inconsistent with an election to
rescind, after discovery of facts purportedly critical to the
rescission, confirm the contract and cause the loss of any claim
of right to rescission.

Erisman v. Overman, 358 P2d 85, 87 (Utah

1961); Frailey v. McGarry, supra, 211 P2d at pp. 844-845.

As the

Frailey Court notes, a party, after learning the truth of the
situation as to the contract, is not permitted to continue
deriving benefits from the transaction, and then later elect to
rescind.
One who would claim rescission is obliged to give
notice of his intent to make that claim, upon discovery of the
facts critical to the claim.

Erisman v. Overman, supra, 358 P2d
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at p. 87; Frailey v. McGarry, supra, 211 P2d at p. 844.

The

party claiming rescission is obliged to act with reasonable
promptness.

Perry v. Woodall, 438 P2d 813, 815 (Utah 1968);

Farrincrton v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co. of Portsmouth, supra,
232 P2d at p. 758; Frailey v. McGarry, supra, 211 P2d at p. 845.
Frailey teaches us that to wait ten months to notify of an
intention to rescind will not get the job done.

Clearly, one

cannot indulge in a vacillating or hesitating course of conduct
while he decides whether to rely upon the contract, to obtain a
modified contract, or to abandon the contract.
McGarry, supra, 211 P2d at pp. 845-846.

Frailey v.

As the Ohio Court notes

in Keyerleber v. Euclid Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, 143
NE2d 313 (Ohio 1957), one who claims rescission is not permitted
to sit on the situation to see how things turn out before notice
of intention to rescind is given.

This is the language of the

Ohio Court:
"They (the plaintiffs) took their gamble and
lost and now seek the aid of a court of
equity to perform like an ace in a game of
skill to rescue them from the unsuccessful
result of their game of change. Equity
cannot lend its aid under such
circumstances."
As Frailey, supra, notes (211 P2d at p. 845), the fact
that you sit back and attempt to negotiate a different agreement
argues against your right to rescission.

In our case, the wait

was from October, 1981, until March, 1985.
Did Dore, on October 8, 1981, the last date which the
trial judge gives as fixing Dore's certain knowledge of the
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problems caused by the Hoffman claims, rescind the contract?
Clearly not.

Rather, apparently without reference to the alleged

cloud created by the Hoffman claims, it asked for an agreement
with United substantially different from the option agreement, an
agreement memorialized in Defendant's Exhibit 13, with a
promissory note of October 8, 1981, memorialized as Defendant's
Exhibit 12.

A few days later, in Idaho, Dore's officers

requested, and obtained, an extension of the October 15, 1981,
deadline upon their option to enter into the "Joint Venture
Agreement".

Those requests continued, and those extensions were

granted through 1982.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3; Defendant's

Exhibits 16, 35, and 36.

Interestingly, Dore did not request

"marketable" title during the extension process, but, rather,
"insurable" title.

Defendant's Exhibit 9 (2-28-82); Plaintiff's

Exhibit 1 (3-5-82).
Dore tells us, however, that despite the above, the
purported breach by United was of such magnitude that it
"defeated the very purpose of the contract", and entitled Dore to
rescind, whatever Dore may have done after its discovery of the
purported breach.

We find no such language in Polyglycoat Corp.

v. Hoicomb, supra.

Neither do we fifid it in Bergstrom v. Moore,

677 P2d 1123 (Utah 1984), another case cited by Dore.
Dore advises the Court that, even if it knew of the
Hoffman claims and their purported cloud upon the mining
properties as it progressed with the Confirmation Agreement work,
this would not defeat its claim to rescission.
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For this

proposition, it cites Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P2d 716
(Utah Ct.App. 1990).

However, in Breuer-Harrison (at p. 726),

the Court found a basis for the buyer's delay in electing to
rescind.

There is no such basis in our case.

The Breuer-

Harrison Court noted that the basic rule certainly is that you
"ought to rescind without delay".

We would think that the cases

which we cite would clearly overcome any comfort which BreuerHarrison might give to Dore.

(We note also the vigorous dissent

by Judge Orem in Breuer-Harrison, even under the circumstances of
that case.)
Dore notes that a discretionary determination made upon
an erroneous interpretation of law serves as a basis for
reversal.

For this proposition, Dore cites Ferris v. Jennings,

595 P2d 857 (Utah 1979); Gaw v. State, 798 P2d 1130 (Utah Ct.App.
1990); and State ex rel. R. R. v. C. R., 797 P2d 459 (Utah
Ct.App. 1990).
testimony.

Gaw concerns the rejection of an expert's

Nothing in State ex rel. R. R. relates to the issue.

Responding to Ferris, we can only say that there was no
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law by Judge Low.
Assuming, but certainly not admitting, that there is
error in the trial court's reasoning as to this question, his
decision is nevertheless correct, and the Utah rule is that a
correct decision, even if based upon erroneous reasoning, is
entitled to be affirmed.

Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P2d 326,

328 (Utah 1980); Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P2d 860, 861
(Utah 1979).
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In summary, the trial court correctly determined that
rescission was inappropriate in this case, and that determination
should stand.

J.

Concerning attorney fees upon appeal.
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates,

617 P2d 406 (Utah 1980), does stand for the proposition that if
fees for enforcement or defense of a contract are allowable below
they should be allowable on appeal.

United would argue that

since it was entitled to an award of attorney fees in the
district court for its defense of the rescission claim, it should
be entitled to an award of attorney fees upon appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The relief sought in United!s Opening Brief should be
granted.

The judgment of the district court, as it relates to

the "Line of Credit" issue, should be reversed, and the district
court should be directed to reinstate the counterclaim and to
proceed to the determination of the appropriate relief due United
on account of the breach of paragraph 5(c) of the Agreement of
May 28, 1981.
The district court's denial of an attorney fee to
United should be reversed and remanded, with directions to the
court to determine an appropriate fee award as to United's
defense of Dore's rescission claim.
The relief requested by Dore should be denied.
is no basis for an additional attorney fee award.

There

There clearly

is no basis for a vacation of the district court's determination
that Dore was not entitled to rescission.
If United is successful in its appeal from the district
court's failure to award attorney fees earned in the defense of
Dore's rescission claim, United should also have its fees upon
appeal.
Respectfully submitted, this 11th day of February,
1991.

Lloyd J. Webb
Utah Bay License No. 3408
Attorneys for Appellant UNITED
SILVER MINES, INC.
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